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This article presents a theory of polity replication in which religious congregants prefer 
institutions in other realms of society, including the state, to be structured like their church. 
Polities, or systems of church governance and administration, generally take one of three forms: 
episcopal (hierarchical/centralized), presbyterian (collegial/regional), or congregational (au-
tonomous/decentralized). When asked to cast a vote to shape institutions in a centralizing or 
decentralizing manner, voters are influenced by organizational values shaped by their respective 
religious traditions‘ polity structures. Past social scientific scholarship has neglected to explicitly 
connect religious affiliation, defined by polity, with members‘ stances on institutional design. 
However, previous examples of polity replication in action include the founding of the United 
States, the perpetuation of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, and the consolidation of the 
European Union. In this article, I provide original data on Roman Catholic and Southern Baptist 
support for city-county consolidation, an example of institutional design in metropolitan 
governance, in Louisville, Kentucky. Logistic regression results show that, other factors being 
equal, episcopal Catholics were 37 percent more likely to support consolidation in the 2000 
referendum than were congregational Southern Baptists. Linear regression results show that 
Catholics were also more approving of the Louisville Metro government three years after its 
creation. In addition, Catholics who attend services more frequently were more supportive of 
consolidation and the consolidated regime. Perhaps owing to their polity structure, the effect of 
attendance for Baptists was unclear. 
                                                 
†
 The following colleagues provided assistance during various stages of this research: John 
Gilderbloom, Corwin Smidt, Hank Savitch, Steve Koven, Jason Gainous, Carrie Donald, David 
Imbroscio, Bob Carini, Matt Hanka, Carey Addison, Isabella Christianson, Katrin Anacker, Bud 
Kellstedt, Michael Leo Owens, and Gerry Beller. An earlier version of this article was presented at 
the 2011 meeting of the Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture. 
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Most scholarship on churches‘ effects on political behavior begins and ends with 
formal church policy positions or more informal ministerial directives issued from 
the pulpit or through interaction with parishioners. Using institutional theory as a 
basis, I propose an additional outlet for religious influence derived from divergent 
religious organizational forms. I call this polity replication. Church polity is the 
term that theologians and sociologists of religion use to describe churches‘ for-
mally defined systems of governance and administration. Polities generally take 
episcopal (hierarchical/centralized), presbyterian (collegial/regional), or congre-
gational (autonomous/decentralized) forms. No past or present social scientific 
scholarship has explicitly argued that there is a connection between religious af-
filiation—defined by denominations‘ distinctive forms of polity—and members‘ 
preferences for institutional design (e.g., the structure of the state). However, it 
can be argued that when asked to cast a vote to shape institutions in a centralizing 
or decentralizing manner, voters are influenced not only by economic self-interest 
but also by organizational values shaped by their respective religious traditions. 
In this article, I theorize that congregants come to prefer institutions in other 
realms of society to be structured similarly to their church polity. The founding of 
the United States of America on Congregationalist principles, Catholic support for 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America, urban political machines in the United 
States, and the European Union consolidation can all be seen as examples of 
polity replication in action (Cairns 1981; Gill 2004; Merton 1972; Nelsen, Guth, 
and Fraser 2001). After discussing the details of past work and my theory, I 
present an analysis of original data on support for city-county consolidation in a 
referendum in Louisville, Kentucky, in 2000. Regression results show that when 
all else is held equal, episcopal Catholics were 37 percent more likely to support 
consolidation than were congregational Southern Baptists, and Catholics were 
more supportive of the postconsolidation regime. In addition, Catholics who 
attend services more frequently were more supportive of consolidation and the 
regime. On the other hand, perhaps owing to their polity structure, the effect of 
attendance for Baptists was unclear. Finally, I discuss implications of this theory 




In the mid-twentieth century, political science—and much of social science in 
general—left behind the study of institutions in favor of the study of individual 
actors, encouraged by the dominant approaches of behavioralism and rational 
choice (Peters 1999). Beginning in the 1980s, a ―counterreformation‖ under the 
banner of new institutionalism returned to examining the importance of formal 
and informal institutions in constraining individual action (Goodin 1996). 
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Scholars are divided over the definition of the term institution. Elinor Ostrom 
(1999: 37) writes that some casually refer to institutions simply as organizational 
entities, while others, including herself, define them as ―rules, norms, and strate-
gies adopted by individuals operating within or across organizations.‖ In simple 
terms, institutions are ideas about how something should be done, structured, or 
otherwise constituted. Ostrom‘s view is representative of the most widely accept-
ed definition in institutional theory. Institutional design, then, is ―the process of 
crafting a configuration of rules . . . aimed at reducing the severity of the trade-
offs among multiple values by shaping incentives in ways that encourage desir-
able behaviors‖ (Oakerson 2004: 20). Meyer, Boli, and Thomas (1987: 36–37) 
define the process of institutionalization as the ―processes that make such sets of 
rules seem natural and taken for granted while eliminating alternative interpre-
tations and regulations. In the Western tradition, rules become institutionalized as 
they are linked more closely to moral authority and lawful order in nature.‖ 
McMullen (1994) links neoinstitutionalism to Berger and Luckmann‘s (1966) 
influential ideas about the social construction of reality, meaning that individuals 
and organizations interact to form socially approved representations of each 
other's actions that, through habituation, become institutionalized and thus under-
stood as objective reality. New institutionalists emphasize how individuals ―learn 
. . . taken-for-granted scripts, habits, routines, rules, and conventional menus and 
categories of action.‖ In other words, ―The views, interests, and beliefs of indi-
viduals themselves are constituted by institutions‖ (McMullen 1994: 710–711). 
While institutions do extend beyond organizational entities, organizations and 
their structures, as Elinor Ostrom (1999) suggests, are typically important compo-
nents of institutional arrangements. Organizations, simply defined, are ―social 
unit[s] with some particular purposes‖ (Shafritz and Ott 1996: 1). In considering 
the differences between organizations and institutions, Powelson (2003) writes, 
―An organization is an administrative and functional structure, clearly bounded, 
while an institution is a significant practice within a culture, such as the institution 
of marriage.‖ In this sense, American religion and metropolitan governance are 
both institutions; individual denominations and congregations are organizations 
with administrative and functional structures. Metropolitan governments are 
organizations that reflect preferences for how an institution should be structured. 
Institutional environments shape organizational structures and culture. According 
to Rainey (2003: 18), organizational structures ―are the relatively stable, 
observable assignments and divisions of responsibility within [an] organization, 
achieved through such means as hierarchies of authority, rules and regulations, 
and specialization of individuals, groups, and subunits.‖ 
Elinor Ostrom (1999: 46) states that in the absence of empirical research 
based on an appropriate framework, ―recommendations of [institutional] reform 
may be based on naïve ideas about which kinds of institutions are ‗good‘ or ‗bad‘ 
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and not on an analysis of performance.‖ This may affect nonexperts‘ choices or 
preferences for institutional design. Ostrom challenges the Homo economicus 
view of human activity that is dominant in neoclassical economics and substitutes 
an understanding of bounded rationality. In this view, information gathering is 
costly, processing capabilities are limited, and decisions are therefore made on the 
basis of ―incomplete knowledge of all possible alternatives and their likely 
outcomes.‖ People can make mistakes (see Vincent Ostrom 1986); for example, 
they can vote in favor of governmental consolidation and later perhaps recognize 
that such a vote was not in their individual interests. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN THE CHURCH 
 
One novel connection between government and religion is this study of institu-
tional design. No work has directly linked internal denominational structures to 
preferences for similar structures in society, such as monocentric or polycentric 
urban governance. All Christian denominations accept some form of religious au-
thority. Offices of authority can take the forms of pope, archbishop, bishop, priest, 
minister, pastor, deacon, or elder. These offices are situated at various levels and 
roughly correspond with equivalent ranks of secular political authority at the 
international, national, regional, and local levels. While most religious bodies 
have varying levels of authority, one often predominates. It is usually clear to 
members and even to outside observers which level is most emphasized in church 
governance (Davidson, Schlangen, and D‘Antonio 1969; McMullen 1994). 
Determining which level of authority should predominate is still a highly con-
troversial issue in twenty-first century churches. This is made obvious by the 
growth of independent, nondenominational, and interdenominational churches in 
the United States and around the world, which essentially opt out of denomi-
national hierarchy in favor of local, congregational control (Smidt et al. 1996). 
Scholars of religious governance refer to denominations‘ forms of polity 
(Davidson, Schlangen, and D‘Antonio 1969; Harrison 1959; McMullen 1994; 
Moberg 1962; Takayama 1974). Citing Harrison, Takayama (1974: 10–11) 
defines polity as ―formally (or theologically) defined aspects of church govern-
ment and administration, including the relation between individual and groups 
within a denomination.‖ McMullen understands religious polity as a form of 
institutionalized myth and ritual. He writes, ―Polities are the rules of ecclesiastical 
authority and dictate the rituals by which church government operates‖ 
(McMullen 1994: 712). 
Takayama describes three main types of church polity: episcopal, presby-
terian, and congregational. In the episcopal type, ―formal hierarchy is most 
explicit . . . the church itself being sometimes finally defined by and restricted to 
the clerical bureaucracy.‖ He lists the Roman Catholic Church as being ―strictly 
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hierarchical,‖ while other examples such as the Protestant Episcopal Church and 
the United Methodist Church are somewhat more ―balance[ed].‖ On the other end 
of the spectrum, ―Congregationalism places the maximum power in the local 
group both with respect to the choice of the minister and the control of 
organizational affairs‖ (Takayama 1974: 11). Prime examples are the variety of 
Baptist groups. Takayama (1974: 29) writes: 
 
Baptists believe that local congregations bear the marks of the true Church and 
theologically they do not accept any higher human authority and organization. 
They believe that their national conventions are merely functional associations of 
local churches formed for their mutual support and a channel for their 
cooperative efforts, but have no binding authority over local churches. 
 
While Takayama notes that Protestant denominations in the contemporary 
United States have tended to resemble one another, many taking the con-
gregational form, the Roman Catholic Church is distinct as the only major body to 
retain a truly hierarchical/centralized polity. Thus a comparison of governance 
structures (polity) in the Catholic Church and, for example, a prominent Baptist 
tradition such as the Southern Baptist Convention should be striking—
theoretically, theologically, and in practice. 
Cairns (1981: 79) argues that the church is simultaneously an ―eternal, invisi-
ble, biblical organism‖ and a ―temporal, historical, visible, human, institutional 
organization [emphasis in original].‖ He identifies these as the respective end and 
means of the church. In essence, the end shapes the means chosen by a particular 
church. Sommerfeld (1968) attributes denominations‘ social structures to their 
theology of the Divine Person or Godhead, which he labels ―the Ultimate.‖ While 
not exactly corresponding with the three historical polities, Sommerfeld‘s typol-
ogy does exhibit striking similarities, confirming Cairns‘s idea that the end (the 
Ultimate) shapes the means (polity). Sommerfeld defines three conceptions of the 
Ultimate: familial, democratic, and dominical. The familial type emphasizes the 
body corporate, that is, the church and its hierarchy (e.g., Catholics); the 
democratic type emphasizes the individual and individual congregations (e.g., 
Baptists). 
In many ways, the whole of the Reformation and later Protestant schisms were 
due primarily to disputes over church governance systems (Barnett 1999; Cairns 
1981; Sullins 2004). Protestant reformers such as the Puritans opposed the ―un-
Christian episcopal hierarchy‖ of Catholicism and ―considered their presby-
terianism outlook [on polity] the same as that of the church polity practiced by the 
apostles‖ (Barnett 1999: 17–18). Despite Vatican II‘s liberal reforms and the 
demands by lower-level clergy and laity for greater roles in church decisions, the 
Catholic Church remains committed to its episcopal form of polity and has 
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offered only minimal concessions to Catholic ―congregationalists‖ (D‘Antonio et 
al. 1989; Kohmescher 1980; White 1972). 
I do not emphasize the presbyterian-type denominations for several reasons: 
(1) There exists a varying degree of reliance on regional institutions in these 
churches, which prevents broad generalizations; (2) Takayama (1974) suggests 
that a move to congregational polity is at work in many presbyterian denomi-
nations, thus making regional institutions largely into ―fifth wheels‖; and (3) past 
studies comparing church polities have also sought to compare examples repre-
senting the poles of church polity rather than all three types (McMullen 1994). 
Research has found that congregants generally perceive the actual structure 
implied by the polity typology of both their own denomination and others‘ 
denominations (Davidson et al. 1969; McMullen 1994). For example, Catholics 
recognize a hierarchical structure in their own churches, although Protestants tend 
to see the Catholic Church in slightly more hierarchical terms than do its own 
members (Davidson et al. 1969). 
No scholarship has examined whether churches intentionally (or implicitly) 
encourage their followers to prefer or replicate these organizational structures 
outside the walls of the church, including the state. Some scholars speak of ―cue 
perceptions,‖ the explicit or implicit instruction provided by religious leaders on 
political matters (Leege 1992; Welch et al. 1993). If conceptions of the Ultimate 
influence denominations‘ own organizational and social forms, as Sommerfeld 
(1968) and Cairns (1981) assert, then might not cues involve replicating a de-
nomination‘s own organizational form? In other words, if political issues concern 
the organization of government, it makes sense that religious believers would 
prefer their own theologically derived organizational forms based in their idea of 
the Ultimate. To use Schattschneider‘s (1960/1975) famous terminology, orga-
nizations are defined by the ―mobilization of bias.‖ In this sense, religious 
organizations may be some of the most biased of all. Clergy and laity spread the 
message of the Gospel, distilled through their particular religious tradition, and 
their own conception of what constitutes the ―true Church‖ and how this body 
should be governed is a key component of such a Gospel. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Political institutions at the national level in the United States are set by 
constitutional prerogative. The roles of Congress (legislature), President 
(executive), and Court (judiciary) have remained relatively unchanged since rati-
fication of the Constitution, despite shifts in importance in one direction or 
another. On the other hand, there is much variation in institutional design at the 
state and local level (Miller 2002). Just as arguments persist over the proper 
organizational structure of religious denominations, so do arguments continue 
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over the ―best‖ form of local governance. At a basic level, these debates pit 
monocentrists against polycentrists (Oakerson 2004). 
Monocentrists, or consolidationists, prefer a single, centralized government 
that has authority over the whole of a metropolitan area and power to regulate 
behavior and development. Polycentrists favor having many localized govern-
ments covering the metropolitan region, ―a pattern of governance that emerges 
from the interactions of multiple independent centers of authority‖ (Oakerson 
2004: 21). While typically emphasizing the benefits of interjurisdictional com-
petition, based on the work of Tiebout (1956), polycentrists also embrace 
institutions that are meant to encourage collective action but without centralizing 
authority (see Feiock 2004). Monocentrists and polycentrists derive their 
commitments from both empirical observation (such as the effect of one form of 
governance on economic development outcomes compared to the effect of 
another) and normative values (such as beliefs about government or the market‘s 
abilities to direct society). Visser (2002) terms the two camps‘ models ―reform-
consolidation‖ and ―market-public choice,‖ respectively. The terms monocentric 
and polycentric are also used to describe historical stages of evolution of urban 
governance in the United States, with reform-minded monocentrism dominating 
the early twentieth century and polycentrism achieving relevance in the mid-
century wake of suburbanization and Tiebout‘s thesis (Schechter 1996; Wallis 
1994). Visser (2002) describes a later wave of reform that encouraged greater 
consolidation in the 1960s and 1970s and again in the 1990s, together culminating 
in several large-scale city-county consolidations: Nashville–Davidson County, 
Tennessee,  in 1962; Jacksonville–Duval County, Florida, in 1967; Indianapolis–
Marion County, Indiana, in 1969; and Louisville–Jefferson County, Kentucky, in 
2003 (Morgan, England, and Pelissero, 2007).
1
 
Is religious fervor, gained through religious participation, responsible, at least 
in part, for passionate views on the structure of urban institutions? Elinor Ostrom 
(2000) alleges that academic monocentrists‘ rely on self-evident truths. She 
makes the case that scholars and policy practitioners often act as if their diagnosis 
and ensuing policy prescriptions are dictated by common sense and therefore 
should be obvious to all. The demonization of metropolitan fragmentation is one 
of her two chief examples. She admits that the ―sheer complexity of . . . [local] 
government service delivery arrangements‖ bewilders most analysts and 
laypeople alike. Many perfunctorily presume that having ―large numbers of small 
governmental units‖ servicing a single metropolitan area obviously leads to 
―inadequate, inefficient, and inequitable services‖ (Elinor Ostrom 2000: 33). The 
                                                 
1
 The terms monocentric and polycentric are also used in urban economics and geography to 
describe theories or observations of the urban spatial form. The political and economic versions of 
monocentrism and polycentrism are not interchangeable. In this study, I use the terms in the 
political-institutional sense. 
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inverse—the idea that large, centralized, consolidated governments are more 
professional, efficient, and equitable—became conventional wisdom. Often 
without recourse to scientific evidence, advocates of monocentrism push to 
consolidate metropolitan regions under a single governmental entity.
2
 Elinor 
Ostrom cites monocentric theorists‘ claims such as ―A diagnosis of the metro-
politan malady is comparatively easy and its logic is too compelling to admit 
disagreement  . . . Nothing, it would seem, could be more obvious or more 
rational [than consolidation]‖ (Hawley and Zimmer 1970: 3). Modern-day ad-
vocates make similar claims, ignoring evidence such as Ostrom‘s comparative 
study of police agencies in eighty metropolitan areas across the United States.
3
 
Religionists often make public reference to their truth‘s self-evidence and are 
encouraged by philosophers and theologians to instead base their policy 
recommendations on rational argument and commonly held values and norms in 
pluralistic societies (e.g., Stout 2004). Perhaps it is only natural that those who 
favor hierarchical church governance or localized, congregational governance 
would see these structural forms as best for all organizations in society. 
Catholics and evangelicals (of whom Southern Baptists constitute the largest 
component in both Louisville and the nation) have the strongest penchant for 
following ministerial cues (Leege 1992). Therefore one would expect these 
denominations to be prime candidates for manifesting polity replication. Past 
research on elite and public Catholic support for urban political machines in the 
United States and  for integration into the European Union (EU) in Europe, where 
Catholic support was significantly higher than that among Protestants, leads one 
to hypothesize that Catholics will exhibit greater support for city-county consoli-




What of the direction of causality? Leege (1992: 200) writes that ―religion is both 
a shaper and mirror of culture and social life.‖ Are religious denominations 
shaping attitudes about the proper design of political institutions or simply mirror-
ing the societal debate and preexisting preferences of outsiders? While mirroring 
no doubt occurs, shaping is much more important and likely in the contemporary 
United States and elsewhere. Cross-national studies indicate, or at least theorize, 
that countries with Catholic majorities exhibit centrist/corporatist forms of 
government, while Protestant nations are more democratic and participatory (e.g., 
                                                 
2
 See Martin and Schiff (2011) for a concise evaluation of how city-county consolidations have 
performed in enhancing efficiency, economic development, and equity. 
3
 Ostrom and her colleagues concluded that small and medium-sized departments are more 
effective in producing direct services and that police performance is enhanced in metropolitan 
areas that have larger numbers of departments. Both findings contradict monocentrists‘ claims.  
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Gill 2004).
4
 A nation‘s religious identity (in most, if not all, cases) predates the 
contemporary governance structure and even the existence of the modern state. 
Christendom was inspired by Christianity‘s universalism, and Catholic support for 
EU integration continues to draw its inspiration from the church‘s social and poli-
tical teachings (Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001). As Max Weber suggested, it is 
religion that affects ―other forms of social and political behavior‖ first—and then 
the culture itself may begin to reshape religion (Gill 2004: 2). 
The roots of the Baptist movement lie in separatist Congregationalism, which 
argued against the state church and was active in England in the late 1500s. Early 
Congregationalist Robert Browne ―argued that believers were to be united to 
Christ and to one another by a voluntary covenant, that officers were to be chosen 
by the [church] members, and that no congregation was to have authority over an-
other‖ (Cairns 1981: 337). Congregationalists were among the first settlers of 
North America who ―applied [this] covenant idea to political life by entering into 
the Mayflower Compact before landing at Plymouth‖ (Cairns: 338). This is a past 
example of congregants‘ vision of church polity, already established, shaping 
other societal and governmental institutions.
5
 The first English Baptist church 
emerged from this movement in the late 1500s, and the first Baptist church in 
North America was established in the 1600s. 
 
POLITY REPLICATION MECHANISMS 
 
A theory of polity replication should emphasize two mechanisms: ideological and 
participatory. Figure 1 illustrates these two forms of polity replication as a path 
diagram that resembles a logic model, a method that program evaluators use to 
understand the theoretical connections between inputs and outcomes (McLaughlin 
and Jordan 1999). The arrows represent directions of causality or feedback loops. 
On one hand, attendance at church worship and religious education shape a con-
gregant‘s views about God and spirituality, state, society, and organizational cul-
ture and values. Presumably, those who are in the pews more often will receive 
more cues and therefore will be more likely to vote on political issues, such as 
                                                 
4
 For example, Gill (2004: 2) writes that in Latin America, ―Catholic leaders and their devout fol-
lowers often had strong preferences for centrist and corporatist forms of government. During the 
nineteenth century, the Church fervently resisted the advance of European liberalism and fuelled 
the preference of practicing Catholics for more corporatist forms of social organization.‖ While 
the Latin American case has colonial baggage, it does seem that the introduction of Protestantism 
and increases in individual religiosity are advancing democratic ideals, local self-governance, and 
civic participation. Comparison of European countries, past and present, reveals similar patterns. 
5
 Other scholars argue that churches‘ organizational structures can reflect their environments. For 
example, many American churches‘ congregational polities may result from national emphases on 
democracy and self-reliance. White (1972: 100) writes, ―we find churches in the free-church 
tradition modeling their ecclesiastical organizations after the political structures of society.‖ 
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consolidation and morality-based referenda, most likely making choices that 
reflect their church‘s official or unofficial positions. 
 
Figure 1: Path Diagram of the Polity Replication Process 
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On the other hand, individuals who participate in church programs and 
governance, where they may also learn civic skills (see Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995), likely develop intense preferences for similar governance structures. 
While participants in corporate or government bureaucracies may come to loathe 
such structures, monetary constraints may prohibit them from leaving. The reli-
gious sector, however, is entirely voluntary; therefore participants can generally 
self-select the church that best fits their preferences (McMullen 1994). Because 
many religious adults were raised as religious children, their preferences for a 
religious tradition are shaped early in life through socialization, and their 
preferences for organizational structure will develop later, on the basis of both 
values and positive or negative experiences. Catholics who become disillusioned 
with church ritual or hierarchy may join a mainline or evangelical Protestant 
congregation following a conversion experience. However, this should not be 
seen as the norm (Hadaway and Marler 1993). Most congregants are likely to 
believe that their church structure is the best or ideal form. 
Although the present study does not explicitly test which form of polity 
replication is at work in consolidation referenda, I posit that both are present. 
However, the effects of each cannot be distinguished from one another, owing to 




City-county consolidation is one form of contemporary metropolitan reform that 
has profound influence on the life and governance of a city. Consolidation 
involves the dissolution of city and county and the creation of a new government 
encompassing the territory of both. Questions remain as to whether the new 
government is a ―city without suburbs‖ or, in cases with powerful suburban 
interests, ―suburbs without a city‖ (Rusk 2003; Savitch and Vogel 2004). 
Consolidation is ―a radical form of organizational change because it is so com-
plete and often difficult to reverse‖ and is thus perhaps the most drastic form of 
institutional redesign available to local governments in the United States (Savitch 
and Vogel 2004: 760). Consolidation is almost universally supported by chambers 
of commerce, which recognize this form of government as more corporate in its 
structure. 
Morgan, England, and Pelissero (2007: 52) summarize the consensus view of 
who typically supports city-county consolidation and who does not: 
 
The central-city business elite, civic organizations, big-city newspapers, and 
reform groups often support reorganization, while suburban newspapers, mayors 
and employees of small towns, fringe-area business people, and central-city 
blacks often lead the opposition. 
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If this is the case, a regression analysis would show individual beliefs about 
consolidation to be positively correlated with socioeconomic indicators such as 
income and education, though this would be tempered by distance from the city 
center, and negatively correlated with suburban residency and African American 
status (Erie, Kirlin, and Rabinovitz 1972; Harrigan 1993; Lyons 1972; Temple 
1972). Temple (1972) and Horan and Taylor (1977) find that sociodemographic 
variables are important predictors of attitudes toward consolidation. However, 
Edwards and Bohland (1991) find that except for residence, sociodemographic 
factors are weak or insignificant predictors of consolidation support. Urban resi-
dents are more likely than suburban residents to support consolidation, while 
suburban residents are more likely than rural residents to support consolidation. 
This suggests a decline in support as one moves farther out from the city center to 
fringe areas. 
Debates over city-county consolidation often center on preferences for 
institutional design, redistribution from suburb to city, political power and trust, 
and views of consolidation elites, which may be reflected in individuals‘ opinions. 
In other words, one‘s opinion about consolidation or a consolidated government 
may be a proxy for one‘s ideas about institutional design (in general terms such as 
the role of government in society), redistribution, political power, or prominent 
personalities. 
Research on religious actors and city-county consolidation is sparse. Carr and 
Feiock (2002) do find that religious organizations exert a modest impact on both 
stages of the consolidation process: agenda-setting and referendum. Their 
comparative study is based on data collected through a national survey of county 
officials in communities that held referenda on city-county consolidation over a 
ten-year period. According to Carr and Feiock (2002: 84), ―Religious groups 
apparently had a very minimal role in the issue; in fact, most respondents (62 
percent) felt these groups had no effect whatsoever.‖ Their data show that only 9 
percent of the responding county officials believed that religious actors had a sig-
nificant involvement in the agenda-setting or referendum stages of consolidation. 
Savitch and Vogel (2004) suggest that churches may have played a role in 
influencing public opinion about consolidation in Louisville: The coalition that 
opposed consolidation, Citizens Organized in Search of the Truth (CO$T), held 
meetings or rallies in local churches. It is unknown, from Savitch and Vogel‘s 
research, to what extent religious organizations themselves took stances on the 
issue. 
Much research on consolidation emphasizes elites‘ or entrepreneurs‘ attitudes 
about consolidation and/or their roles in placing the issue on the agenda and 
bankrolling electoral support (e.g., Durning and Edwards 1992). Although 
consolidation may be put on the agenda by elites, it is decided by the voting 
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public. The influence of religious commitment on voters‘ perceptions of consoli-
dation and decisions in consolidation referenda has not been investigated. 
Current research on private actors‘ involvement in the consolidation issue is 
rather pluralist in orientation and based on power‘s first face, that is, decision 
making (Dahl 1961/2005), or, at best, its second face, manipulating agendas 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Consolidation scholars ignore more recent 
developments in power theory, such as Lukes‘s (2005) third face of power, 
manipulating people‘s preferences. Religious organizations exercise power‘s third 
face in addition to the first two. Church members make their own individual 
decisions that they believe are based on their own conclusions but are indeed 
shaped by the church and its leadership. This use of power is not necessarily 
nefarious or even conscious. While it is assumed that business, labor, and political 
groups shape preferences, religious organizations are often ignored. Although 
Carr and Feiock‘s (2002) respondents might not have witnessed the hand of the 
church in action, religious organizations affected consolidation referendum 
outcomes at least through their encouragement (or discouragement) of civic 
involvement and their impartation of civic skills (Sharp 2007; Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady 1995). The building of civic skills in churches is known to vary 
according to the type of church polity. Hierarchical church structures such as 
those of Catholic churches are less conducive to learning civic skills than are the 
more participatory structures of Protestant congregations (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). 
Religious organizations also shape attitudes about morality and institutional 
design and thus affect the outcome of a consolidation referendum. Scholars have 
ignored the application of power‘s third face to the study of religion and 
institutional design. While churches may play minimal, if any, roles in setting 
metropolitan agendas and influencing the public, they certainly shape members‘ 
values and worldviews (Naugle 2002; Sire 2004). 
 
LOUISVILLE CASE STUDY 
 
To test my thesis in a contemporary case, I investigated the impact of religious 
affiliation on attitudes toward city-county consolidation in Louisville–Jefferson 
County, Kentucky. Louisville is an interesting locale for exploration of religious 
affiliation and its implications for local institutional design, owing to both its rich 
religious history and its recent political innovation. Louisville is a midsized city 
bordering the southern and midwestern regions of the country; it has long been 
labeled the ―gateway from the North to the South‖ (McMeekin 1946: 256). The 
city is historically Democratic and Roman Catholic but is located in a politically 
―red‖ state within the contemporary Bible Belt. Louisville has sizable populations 
of Roman Catholics, black Protestants, and white evangelical Protestants, 
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particularly Southern Baptists, as well as several large megachurches, two 
prominent seminaries (one being Southern Baptist), the offices of a Catholic 
archdiocese, and a Protestant denominational headquarters. Louisville is home to 
over 500 individual religious congregations (Barlow 2004; Gaustad and Schmidt 
2004; Hartford Institute for Religious Research 2009; Jones et al. 2002). 
Louisville‘s medium size and relative geographic isolation make it more 
manageable for a case study than often-studied ―megacities‖ and other midsized 
cities located within megalopolis regions (Ambrosius, Gilderbloom, and Hanka 
2010). Barlow (2004) argues that the Midwest is the most representative of the 
United States as a whole of any of the country‘s regions, demographically and in 
terms of religious affiliation. Louisville lies on the midwestern frontier, an area 
referred to as ―Kentuckiana‖ because of its border with Indiana (Barlow 2004). 
Louisville shares many characteristics, including ethnic and cultural diversity, 
with nearby midwestern cities such as Cincinnati, Ohio, its ―Ohio River sister 
city‖ (Williams 2004: 217). On the other hand, the U.S. Census Bureau places 
Louisville in the southern region, which has long been said to possess a distinct 
regional subculture (Ellison and Musick 1993; Salisbury 1962). Thus Louisville 
could be termed the Upper South or the Lower Midwest (Ownby 2005). Although 
research findings from Louisville are not necessarily representative of the nation 
as a whole, or even all other cities (see Stein 1960), a study that is conducted in 
Louisville is likely to uncover conditions that are more reflective of ―typical‖ 
American communities and citizens than will studies of cultural and social 
outliers such as New York City or Los Angeles.
6
 
While interesting for religious and geographic reasons, Louisville has also 
drawn attention for its recent political reforms. Residents of the City of Louisville 
and surrounding Jefferson County voted to consolidate their governments in a 
2000 referendum, with the merger of city and county to be completed by 2003 
(Savitch and Vogel 2004). This was the first large-scale consolidation in a U.S. 
city since Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana, merged in 1969 (Morgan, 
England, and Pelissero 2007). Following consolidation, Louisville has become a 
magnet for scholars of urban studies, regional planning, and public administration 
(Brookings Institution 2002; Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004; Rusk 
2003). 
The central research question is: Does religious affiliation influence indivi-
duals‘ preferences for institutional design, manifested by vote choice in a con-
solidation referendum and approval of a merged city-county government? The 
two dominant religious affiliations in Louisville are Roman Catholics (one quarter 
of the population) and Southern Baptists (one sixth of the population) (Jones et al. 
                                                 
6
 Also see Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg (1991). A previous study with similar goals used a southern 
community (Atlanta, Georgia) to test general hypotheses without significant reference to the 
study‘s regional context (McMullen 1994). 
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2002).
7
 I hypothesized that Southern Baptists will be less likely than Catholics to 
support consolidation or, the converse, Catholics will be more likely to support 
consolidation. This effect should be exhibited in both the referendum vote and 
opinions about the consolidated entity. Black Protestants, who often share con-
gregational polity, will likely view a consolidated regime with skepticism (Porter 
2008; Savitch and Vogel 2004). The religiously unaffiliated often align with the 
liberal end of the political spectrum and the Democratic Party in U.S. politics 
(Leege and Kellstedt 1993). Their views of consolidation could go either way: in 
support of far-left critics or in alliance with the local Democratic establishment. 
Non-Christian religions compose such a small proportion of Louisville‘s pop-
ulation that an attempt to understand particular traditions‘ positions using random 
survey data is particularly difficult, and any collective effect is nonsensical 
because of the inclusion of vastly different traditions. Furthermore, I expected 
higher socioeconomic status (as determined by education, income, full-time 
employment, and single-family home residence) to translate into electoral support 
for consolidation. I expected black, conservative, and suburban voters to oppose 
consolidation. There is little literature to draw from in predicting the consolidation 
views of women and older and married people; therefore these relationships are 
unclear and perhaps not statistically significant. One might theorize, though, that 
all of these groups are more trusting and therefore more likely to support the 
consolidation entrepreneurs‘ efforts. 
 
DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHODS 
 
The data for this study were drawn from the Louisville Metropolitan Survey 
(LMS) conducted in spring 2006 by the University of Louisville‘s Urban Studies 
Institute in consultation with the university‘s Department of Sociology, whose 
faculty designed the questionnaire (Department of Sociology 2006). The unit of 
analysis is the individual. Survey respondents were chosen by random digit dial-
ing across Jefferson County, Kentucky (Louisville Metro), a technique that result-
ed in a sample of 807 complete interviews with adult respondents aged 18 or over. 
Participants were asked for responses on political, moral, and religious issues 
along with basic sociodemographic characteristics. Scholars who have utilized the 
2006 LMS data have noted that the respondents compare favorably with 2000 
U.S. Census data and are therefore likely fairly representative of Louisville‘s 
                                                 
7
 This large presence of Catholics distinguishes Kentucky from other parts of the South and is due 
to northern Kentucky‘s location at the base of the ―German Triangle,‖ with points in nearby 
Cincinnati, Ohio; St. Louis, Missouri; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (Ownby 2005). A geographic 
analysis of the dominant religious traditions in U.S. counties finds that Louisville is the boundary 
between Southern Baptist territory, stretching north from the Gulf of Mexico, and German 
Catholic territory coming down from the central Midwest (Jones et al. 2002). 
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population, though these analyses examine only a subsection of respondents who 
were asked environmental questions (Gilderbloom, Hanka, and Ambrosius 2009; 
Walton 2006). In the present analysis, I found that the full sample is somewhat 
more female, older, and more educated than U.S. Census Bureau data for 2006. 
The sample also drew slightly more white respondents than the proportion in the 
population of Jefferson County. Consequently, I weighted the sample to reflect 




A large portion of the LMS is devoted to the 2003 merger of Jefferson County 
and the City of Louisville. I created two dummy variables and a factor score index 
for use as dependent variables in the models. First, I established whether a 
respondent voted in the merger referendum by using the basic question ―Did you 
vote for the merger, against the merger, or did you not vote at all?‖ I summed 
those voting for or against the merger and coded them as 1. I then coded those 
who lived in Jefferson County or Louisville in 2000 but did not vote as 0. Those 
who were ineligible to vote, meaning that they reported living elsewhere in 2000, 
were coded as ―system missing.‖ This does exclude those who lived in Jefferson 
County but were unregistered to vote or otherwise ineligible. According to these 
LMS questions, 59 percent of adults who lived in Jefferson County reported 
voting in the 2000 merger referendum. Second, from the same question, I 
established whether a voter supported consolidation. Of the 59 percent of re-
spondents who reported a vote, roughly 70 percent supported consolidation and 
30 percent opposed it.
9
 Finally, I used the follow-up questions that were asked of 
all respondents, regardless of whether they voted, to create a factor score of 
support for the merger and subsequent merged government. In short, the items 
asked whether the respondent is (1) better off since the merger, (2) trusting of the 
merged government, (3) convinced that the merger benefits all residents, (4) 
convinced that the merged government does not waste taxes, (5) convinced that 
the merged government‘s employees are honest, and (6) convinced that race 
relations have improved since consolidation. All items load on a single factor.
10
 
                                                 
8
 Rather than using 2000 Census data, which possibly would eliminate important demographic 
shifts that occurred over the six years from 2000 to 2006, I utilize three-year estimates from the 
American Community Survey (ACS), 2005–2007. The three-year estimates are more reliable than 
an ACS collected in a single year; and the LMS collection year forms the center of the ACS 
analysis period. The weighting process successfully weighted male, black, younger, and less-
educated respondents to their approximate levels in the population. 
9
 The actual referendum results show that 54 percent of voters approved consolidation. As in most 
surveys, a slightly higher percentage of respondents reported voting than the percentage that ac-
tually turned out, and more reported supporting the winning vote (in this case, consolidating the 
city and county). This makes the use of an approval index all the more valuable in this analysis. 
10
 The eigenvalue is greater than 2.5, and most factor loadings are high, although the questions on 
whether the merger has made one better off and whether it has improved race relations load lower. 
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The independent variables are religious affiliation, religiosity, political 
ideology, socioeconomic and demographic controls, and a measure of suburban-
ization.
11
 The LMS asks the basic question ―What is your religious preference?‖ 
The choices are (1) Baptist, (2) other Protestant denomination, (3) Roman 
Catholic, (4) a Christian religion not yet mentioned, (5) a non-Christian religion, 
and (6) no religious preference. The dominant white American religious traditions 
are Roman Catholic, mainline Protestant, and evangelical Protestant (Smidt, Kell-
stedt, and Guth 2009). This LMS question does not allow for a division of 
Protestants into mainline and evangelical branches. However, for unknown rea-
sons, the question does isolate the Baptist group. The likely reason for this is their 
prevalence in Louisville, largely divided into white Southern Baptists and various 
African-American Baptist traditions. An identification of evangelical Protestants 
is further hindered by their likely inclusion in several response categories: Baptist, 
other Protestant, a Christian religion, and even no religious preference.
12
 
Given the constraints, the best possible classification scheme divides the LMS 
sample into Southern Baptists, Black Protestants, other Protestants, Roman Cath-
olics, other Christians, other non-Christians, and the unaffiliated. Southern Bap-
tists are identified as the white respondents who selected ―Baptist.‖ This category 
likely includes a few mainline or other evangelical Baptists because the percen-
tage of Baptists in the LMS (18.5 percent) is slightly higher than the 15.6 percent 
found by the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Study (RCMS), 
although the bulk of white Baptists in Louisville are indeed Southern Baptists, as 
is the case across the South (see Shortridge 1976). The RCMS finds 164 Southern 
Baptist congregations but only 28 other Baptist congregations, which together 
account for a mere 0.5 percent of religious adherents in Louisville (Jones et al. 
2002). Black Protestants are identified as black respondents who selected 
―Baptist,‖ ―other Protestant,‖ or ―a Christian religion.‖ This category accounts for 
18.0 percent of the LMS sample. While some of these Black Protestants may be 
members of largely white denominations, the vast majority likely are members of 
                                                 
11
 A major weakness of the dataset is the lack of a political party identifier. The use of a proxy 
(support for President George W. Bush) in regression models found a positive effect on support 
for consolidation, a surprising finding. The Bush proxy was not used as a control in the final 
models because it was asked of only a subsection of the LMS sample. 
12
 Non-Baptist evangelical Protestants who are unfamiliar with the Protestant label likely 
answered, ―A Christian religion not yet mentioned‖ or, for those in nondenominational or 
independent churches, perhaps even ―No religious preference.‖ Many Christians, particularly 
evangelicals or born-again Christians, deny that their faith is comparable to other traditions and 
therefore feel that it should not be labeled a religion (e.g., see Ridenour 1967). It is clear that the 
―other Christian religion‖ category includes respondents beyond Eastern Orthodox and 
conservative nontraditionalists (e.g., Mormons and Jehovah‘s Witnesses) that are not captured by 
the other categories, because the number of respondents who chose this category are greater than 
these traditions‘ rates in the population (see Jones et al. 2002). 
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congregations associated with historically black denominations.
13
 The Roman 
Catholic category is fairly straightforward, because it was selected by the re-
spondents themselves; with 23.6 percent of respondents, the Roman Catholic 
Church is it the largest religious body in Louisville. Other non-Christians, in-
cluding Jews, Muslims, and Hindus, are represented by only a few respondents 
(3.3 percent) and, as a composite category, are unfit for stringent analysis. The 
other Christian categories—other Protestants (13.0 percent) and other Christians 
(10.4 percent)—are ambiguous and likely include a mix of mainline Protestants 
such as Lutherans and Methodists, evangelical Protestants including Pentecostals 
and self-defined fundamentalists, Eastern Orthodox traditions, and other traditions 
that embrace the generic ―Christian‖ label. There is no way to subdivide these two 
categories into these individual traditions. The remaining category, the religiously 
unaffiliated, accounts for 13.2 percent of the LMS sample. 
All religious categories are included in statistical analysis, but the Southern 
Baptist and Roman Catholic traditions are the dominant ones in Louisville and the 
key affiliations under study. Therefore they receive primary attention in the 
discussion of the findings. All traditions are constructed as dummy variables; 1 
was assigned for affiliates and 0 for nonaffiliates. Catholic serves as the reference 
category for regression analysis to directly compare with Southern Baptist. 
The LMS asks a host of questions about religious salience, behaviors, and 
beliefs. I constructed an index of religiosity from both datasets using factor 
analysis. This index sums information from three religious salience questions, two 
religious behavior questions (one public, one private), and one belief question. 
These LMS questions capture the importance of religion, desire to become more 
religious, closeness to God, worship/religious activity attendance, frequency of 
scripture reading, and belief in an afterlife. All measures load on a single factor.
14
 
Political ideology is captured by a five-point scale of conservatism. The LMS 
asks the question ―Do you think of yourself as a Liberal, a Conservative, or as 
middle-of-the-road?‖ It then follows up with ―Do you consider yourself a strong 
or not very strong [liberal or conservative]?‖ I combined these two questions to 
create the following scale: (1) strong liberal, (2) weak liberal, (3) moderate, (4) 
weak conservative, and (5) strong conservative. 
Individual socioeconomic and demographic control variables include sex, 
race, age, educational attainment, annual income, employment status, marital 
status, and dwelling type. Several of these are measured as dummy variables with 
values of 1 for female, black, full-time employment, married, and single-family 
                                                 
13
 As the cliché goes, eleven o‘clock Sunday morning is the most segregated hour in America 
(Hadaway, Hackett, and Miller 1984). Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009) argue that black 
Protestants as a whole exhibit similar social, political, and theological positions and therefore 
deserve their own category without division into evangelical and mainline. 
14
 The eigenvalue exceeds 3.0, and the explained variance exceeds 50 percent. 
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home residency and 0 for all others.
15
 Age is an interval level variable measured 
in years. Education (1–8) and income (1–9) are ordinal-level variables measuring 
categories of educational attainment and income, respectively. 
The LMS allows for classification of respondents by place of residence. For 
confidentiality, addresses were not collected, but respondents may be coded with 
their distance from the central business district on the basis of their provided ZIP 
codes. I use a GIS (geographic information systems) tool to calculate the distance 
from each ZIP code‘s centroid to the downtown ZIP code‘s centroid (40202). 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables drawn from the dataset. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
City-county consolidation 
     Vote dummy 710   0.59   — 0 1 
Vote choice dummy 417   0.71   — 0 1 
Merger support index 709   0.00   1.00    −2.14     2.09 
Religious identification 
     Roman Catholic dummy 805   0.24   — 0 1 
Southern Baptist dummy 805   0.19   — 0 1 
Black Protestant dummy 805   0.18   — 0 1 
Other Protestant dummy 805   0.13   — 0 1 
Other Christian dummy 805   0.10   — 0 1 
Non-Christian dummy 805   0.03   — 0 1 
Unaffiliated dummy 805   0.13   — 0 1 
Religiosity index 805   0.00   1.00    −2.94     1.36 
Conservatism 805   3.10   1.15 1 5 
Sex: female dummy 805   0.51   — 0 1 
Race: black dummy 795   0.21   — 0 1 
Age (years) 788 48.27 17.78 18 96 
Education 805   4.22   1.80 1 8 
Income 699   4.93   2.70 1 9 
Employed full time dummy 805   0.46   — 0 1 
Married dummy 805   0.46   — 0 1 
House dummy 805   0.75   — 0 1 
Suburbanization (miles from 
central business district) 805 10.21   4.91     0.00   23.85 
                                                 
15
 The black dummy variable is excluded from these analyses, owing to excessive multicollinearity 
with black Protestant. Almost 95 percent of African-Americans in Louisville are black Protestants. 
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This study uses two multivariate modeling techniques to address the research 
questions: linear regression, or ordinary least squares regression, and binary 
logistic regression. I constructed a multiple linear regression (MLR) model pre-
dicting the merger index, and I used a binary logistic regression model (BLRM) to 




Table 2 reports results of a BLRM predicting electoral support for city-county 
consolidation in Louisville.  This  model explains approximately 19 percent of the  
 
Table 2: Individual Electoral Support for Consolidation in Louisville (BLRM) 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
(Constant)   1.648 0.913 
Female −0.029 0.269 
Age −0.009 0.010 
Education       0.267** 0.085 
Income   0.060 0.071 
Employed full time −0.134 0.304 
Married   0.133 0.315 
House −0.718 0.394 
Conservatism −0.172 0.109 
Suburbanization −0.050 0.029 
Religiosity −0.010 0.178 
Southern Baptist   −0.880* 0.352 
Black Protestant   0.253 0.437 
Other Protestant   0.806 0.473 
Other Christian −0.163 0.439 
Non-Christian −1.166 0.692 
Unaffiliated   0.203 0.578 
   −2 log likelihood 381.001 
 Nagelkerke pseudo-R
2
    0.190 
 N 410   
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
Reference category is Roman Catholic.  
Black is excluded, owing to multicollinearity with black Protestant. 
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variation in electoral support. The key finding is that Southern Baptists gave 
significantly less electoral support to consolidation than Roman Catholics did. 
Baptists were indeed less likely to report voting in favor of consolidating city and 
county in Louisville. The predicted probability, other independent variables being 
held constant at their means, of a Catholic voting in favor of consolidation is 0.74, 
whereas the predicted probability of a Southern Baptist voting in favor is 0.54. 
The only other significant variable in the model is education, which demonstrates 
a positive relationship. 
Table 3 contains the results of a MLR model predicting individual approval of 
the consolidated government in the  years since completion of the merger in 2003.  
 




Coefficient Standard Error 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
(Constant)     0.075 0.240 — 
Female   −0.057 0.080 −0.029 
Age     0.004 0.002   0.073 
Education          0.104*** 0.025   0.187 
Income        0.056** 0.020   0.153 
Employed full time    −0.215* 0.087 −0.108 
Married    0.024 0.090   0.012 
House       −0.451*** 0.097 −0.192 
Conservatism   −0.075* 0.033 −0.089 
Suburbanization   −0.019* 0.008 −0.095 
Religiosity   0.095 0.049   0.097 
Southern Baptist   −0.268* 0.115 −0.108 
Black Protestant     −0.343** 0.127 −0.131 
Other Protestant   0.034 0.131   0.011 
Other Christian   0.073 0.142   0.022 
Non-Christian   0.123 0.216   0.023 
Unaffiliated −0.051 0.154 −0.017 
    F       7.067*** 
  Adjusted R
2
  0.136 
  N 616     
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
Reference category is Roman Catholic.   
Black is excluded, owing to multicollinearity with black Protestant. 
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The dependent variable is the consolidation factor score. The amount of explained 
variation is just below 14 percent. Again, Southern Baptists express significantly 
less approval of consolidation than Catholics do. If one restricts the model to re-
spondents who identify as Catholics and Southern Baptists, the coefficient on 
Southern Baptist is −0.256 (p < 0.05), nearly identical to the coefficient when the 
full sample is analyzed. The adjusted R
2
 for the model limited to Catholics and 
Southern Baptists is 0.160, greater than that for the full sample. Several other 




To test whether consolidation vote or the index serve as proxies for other 
variables, I constructed MLR models (not shown) for the mass public from the 
2006 General Social Survey predicting individual attitudes about redistribution to 
central cities (ordinal variable measuring support for expanding assistance to big 
cities) and an index of political trust (factor score). I used equivalent (or as similar 
as possible) measures of religious tradition (or measures that were as similar as 
possible), religiosity, and sociodemographic controls. Southern Baptists and 
Catholics do not differ in their support for expanding assistance to central cities. 
Southern Baptists do possess less political trust than Catholics, although the co-
efficient is weak and significant only at the 0.1 level. Southern Baptists and 
Catholics in Louisville also exhibit nearly identical residential patterns and 




If a polity replication effect is present, parishioners with more exposure to 
church activities and cues might be expected to exhibit greater (Catholic) or lesser 
(Southern Baptist) levels of support for consolidation than is shown by those who 
are minimally involved with the tradition. Regression models that are restricted to 
members of either the Catholic or the Southern Baptist tradition do not find a 
significant effect for the religiosity index as an independent variable (models not 
shown). However, Figures 2 and 3 present data on the general relationship be-
tween consolidation support and religious participation and salience, respectively, 
for both Catholics and Southern Baptists. 
Figure 2 shows that Catholics who attend church more frequently tend to offer 
higher levels of support for the merged government than do those who attend 
nominally (that is, every few months). The relationship among Southern Baptists 
is unclear; Southern Baptists who attend every other week offer the highest level 
                                                 
16
 Both traditions are concentrated in the inner suburbs, the remainder of each being divided 
equally between the central city and the outer suburbs. There is no statistically significant 
difference between the traditions‘ means on the five-point political ideology scale; both are 
moderate but slightly right of center. 
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of support, while those who attend once a month and those who attend every 
week are about equally lower in their level of support. Southern Baptists who 
attend nominally exhibit the lowest level of support for the merger, which is also 
the case for Catholics. A church attendance variable is significant and positive 
(0.118; p < 0.05; beta: 0.184) in a regression model that is restricted to Catholics, 




Figure 2: Merger Index Means by Church Attendance for  




Figure 3 displays the relationship between merger support and religious 
salience for each tradition. Here, Catholics again demonstrate a positive rela-
tionship between, in this case, salience and support for consolidated government. 
The relationship for Southern Baptists is again unclear; consolidation support 
declines as one moves from ―slightly important‖ to ―important‖ but then rebounds 
slightly for those in the ―very important‖ category. Importance of religion is not 
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Figure 3: Merger Index Means by Religious Importance for  






I have argued for a theory of polity replication: that participation with religious 
structures conditions parishioners to prefer similar structures in other realms of 
society, including the state. In addition to theoretical and past evidence from the 
literature, I have presented original data showing that, as the theory predicts, 
Roman Catholics exhibit a greater preference for consolidated government than 
Southern Baptists do. 
When examining the effects of religious participation, I conclude that greater 
exposure to church activities and greater levels of religious salience are more 
important in shaping consolidation views in Catholics than in Southern Baptists. 
Catholics may care more about the issue of consolidation, perhaps because of the 
strong Catholic educational institutions in Louisville promoting the Catholic 
worldview and polity replication.
17
 Past research confirms that participation in a 
church‘s institutional structure is more important in hierarchical polities such as 
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 This was suggested by one Catholic member of the postconsolidation Louisville Metro Council, 
who is also a teacher at a Catholic high school. 
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the Catholic Church. McMullen (1994: 724) argues that ―a congregational polity 
cannot mobilize individual behavior or attitudes to the same extent as an episcopal 
polity can . . . because of its particular myth of ecclesiastical authority embedded 
in its institutional structure.‖ He admits that this argument may seem coun-
terintuitive, because one ―might expect the more ‗democratic‘ congregational 
polity . . . to allow for the free flow of information, facilitating members‘ 
knowledge about organizational policy.‖ But he adds: 
 
It is precisely the lack of legitimated hierarchical authority promoted by a 
congregational polity (i.e., a loosely structured institution) that severs the 
connections between the local church and national leadership. The institutional 
myth of local church autonomy prevents mechanisms from being socially 
constructed to facilitate the movement of information between institutional 
levels, as well as the interest and motivation for even listening to what is being 
said ―from on high‖ (McMullen 1994: 724). 
 
Concerning the Catholic Church, McMullen (1994: 724) writes: 
 
one might expect that the greater bureaucratic maze maintained by the 
institutional myth of ecclesiastical authority would clog communication 
channels; but instead, those myths have socially constructed the motivation for 
parishioners to be aware of church policy, exactly because they acknowledge as 
legitimate the authority of the episcopal authority. 
 
My findings offer further support for McMullen‘s assertions. Socialization, poli-
tical or otherwise, appears to be more effective among episcopal denominations 
such as the Catholic Church than among congregational traditions such as 
Southern Baptists. This finding lends greater credence, and another dimension, to 
a theory of polity replication. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study‘s theory and findings hold implications for social science, church 
practice, and politics and policymaking. This analysis contributes to social 
scientific literature in several ways. This study extends the understanding of reli-
gious polities as institutions pioneered by McMullen and others. It further shows 
how new institutionalism can enhance the study of institutional design in urban 
governance, the cornerstone of the urban politics field.
18
 Polity replication also 
suggests psychological political effects of voluntary institutional association and 
membership. This theory opens up a new strain of research in organizational and 
                                                 
18
 Other scholars have called for investigation of new institutionalism‘s implications for urban 
politics (Lowndes 2001, 2009). 
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institutional theory with implications for the study of political science. For 
example, Roman Catholics may be more likely than Baptists (to use the two key 
traditions of this study) and other Protestants to view international organization 
and nation-state cooperation with favor (see Nelsen, Guth, and Fraser 2001). 
Furthermore, if participants in religious denominations are in fact influenced to 
prefer particular institutional forms outside the church, perhaps other private 
associations—from hierarchical corporations to community-based citizen asso-
ciations—similarly encourage structural preferences (pro or con). McMullen‘s 
(1994) work was motivated partially by a desire to understand religious in-
stitutions as differentiated from other institutions because of their voluntary 
nature. My findings suggest the value of further exploration of the links between 
religious denominations‘ structures and individual preferences for institutional 
design in all realms of politics and society. 
Understanding the effects of polity replication may also influence religious 
life. Despite their profound and long-standing differences, Roman Catholics and 
Baptists have engaged in a series of recent talks meant to identify common 
elements of their faiths and areas for future dialogue (Radano 2007). It is clear to 
observers that any efforts at reconciliation will face difficulty in moving past the 
inflammatory rhetoric of the past and the vast doctrinal and cultural divide 
(Freeman 2009; Truett 2001). As Monsignor John Radano (2007) notes, ―Baptists 
will hesitate to join in a call for structural unity or doctrinal unity‖—the two legs 
of the church: polity and conceptions of the Ultimate. These differences tend to 
mask a contemporary tendency toward balance in the practice of church polity. 
Some scholars find that the Southern Baptist Convention is no longer as de-
centralized as many other Protestant and evangelical denominations are. In fact, 
Sullins (2004) labels the Southern Baptist Convention ―moderately centralized,‖ 
or less decentralized than over 100 other Protestant denominations—a list that in-
cludes many Baptist denominations. Following the liberalizing reforms of Vatican 
II, the Catholic Church is less centralized than ever and is feeling pressure for 
further reforms. Although churches with presbyterian polities were once thought 
of as occupying a middle ground, this model is largely defunct, and these 
denominations are becoming more and more congregational (see Takayama 
1974). This leaves the poles of polity, each of which is adopting elements of its 
opposite. 
In the 1970s, White (1972: 107) wrote a proposition for future review: 
―Resolution of problems centering around social acceptance by the dominant 
society will tend to force the churches in the direction of conformity with con-
stituting norms calling for more decentralized decision-making and greater 
centralization [emphasis added].‖ Thus, even more than thirty years ago, the 
middle ground was becoming some combination of centralized authority and 
decentralized decision making. While the poles of polity remain the same, they 
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are each, to borrow the Hegelian/Marxian triad, navigating toward a synthesis of 
thesis (centralized) and antithesis (decentralized). This parallels a similar move in 
other realms of society: from how we live (Old Urbanism versus Suburbanism to 
New Urbanism [Bohl 2000]) and how we organize metropolitan governance (Old 
Regionalism versus Polycentrism to New Regionalism [Savitch and Vogel 2009]) 
to how we manage our public sector organizations (Traditional Public Manage-
ment versus New Public Management/Privatization to a synthesis that is in de-
velopment [Norman 2009]). It would seem that somewhat centralized organi-
zations that simultaneously adopt some decentralized elements are best suited to 
govern our congregations and communities. Churches of all stripes and sizes are 
moving in the direction of this middle ground—a balanced polity, or polity 
synthesis—that gleans best practices from both types. Whether centralization or 
decentralization will predominate has yet to be determined, as does the effect on 
societal institutional design at large. 
This study has found that pronounced differences do exist today between 
followers of different religious traditions on seemingly nonspiritual issues. 
Leaders of religious denominations and congregations should carefully consider 
the cues, intentional and unintentional, they are displaying for congregants to 
absorb. In light of organizational change, do congregations still wish to encourage 
parishioners to pattern their political opinions after churches‘ wavering commit-
ments to organizational structures that arose in the distant past? This is a question 
with which individual traditions must grapple as a new political and economic 
synthesis arises (see Norman 2009). 
It is clear that political and religious pluralism has been positive for 
development of the United States as a liberal democracy. The United States 
typifies the so-called denominational principle, which ―rests on the assumption 
that all churches are good, and it does not matter to which church one belongs, 
just so he [or she] belongs.‖ This ideal is distinctly American, the result of the 
―institutionalization of the norm of religious pluralism‖ (White 1972: 104). 
Despite recent attacks on religion by the ―new atheists,‖ religious organizations 
should continue to take on the role of political participants in the public square, 
including local elections and referenda on issues such as consolidation. Their 
participation is not only healthy but also necessary for vibrant democracy 
(Putnam 2000). If Louisville contained a different mix of religious traditions (e.g., 
fewer Roman Catholics) but the same sociodemographic composition, it is 
possible (maybe even likely) that consolidation would not have been enacted. 
Religious bodies, no matter the tradition, wield power and must use this power 
peacefully to craft the better worlds envisioned by their tradition. 
Finally, on the political front, my findings allow reformer-entrepreneurs to 
look beyond class and racial lines to better rally support or opposition for reforms 
of metropolitan government or governance. For example, lower, middle, and 
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upper class groupings, particularly among whites, are all divided along religious 
lines. Although lower strata may be more fundamentalist and upper strata might 
be more mainline, it is clear that each level of society has elements of many re-
ligious traditions. Emphasizing a particular economic subgroup—the poor, the 
middle class, or the wealthy—in a political or policy campaign is naive if one 
does not differentiate potential supporters among each grouping. Because of 
beliefs about religious and societal authority, it may be wise to target grassroots 
efforts at particular religious traditions that are predisposed to support one‘s 
cause. 
Republicans have rallied religious publics very well in recent elections, and 
Democrats are getting better at speaking the language of faith, as demonstrated by 
their successful 2008 bid for the White House (Pew Forum on Religion & Public 
Life 2008; Smidt et al. 2010). Most observers would agree that partisan affiliation 
is not as significant in local elections as it is in national elections. This does not 
mean that political differences in party or ideology do not matter locally—far 
from it. But locally, voters may reach across the aisle to support a friend or family 
member‘s bid for office or a ―commonsense‖ policy strategy originating with the 
other party. After all, local politics are often more mundane politics—or ―sewage 
without tears,‖ to use one metaphor (John 2009: 19)—that can elicit less 
passionate responses and lower electoral turnout. But if religious differences exist 
over seemingly mundane issues such as whether two independent governments 
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